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Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas once said, "Tax statutes and tax
regulations never have been static. Experience, changing needs, and changing
philosophies inevitably produce constant change in each."' This sentiment is
especially true with regard to regulations governing technology. Technological
change occurs at a quicker pace than legislation can be written and congres-
sional consensus can be achieved. Must the language of the law be amended to
reflect change or should the static language of the law be interpreted to reflect
changing technologies?
Congress established the current statutory framework for taxing communica-
tions services in 1965.2 At that time, a different landscape existed: one where
AT&T held a monopoly on long-distance telephone service3 and the distance
and length of a call determined long-distance charges.' Today, there are un-
precedented levels of competition.' There is an exponential growth of cellular
I Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 97 (1939).
2 Excise Tax Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-48 (1965)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4254 (2000)) (establishing scheme providing
for local and long-distance communications services to be taxed at a declining percentage
rate).
3 See generally CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS LAW, xviii-xxi (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the "Age of Monopoly" in telephone ser-
vice); see also Declaration of Alan Pearce at 4-5, XO Commc'ns v. United States, No. 03-
2754 (Fed. Cl. filed Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Pearce Declaration] ("For approximately the
first 100 years of telephony, long-distance transmission facilities and services were con-
trolled and provided by AT&T.").
4 Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 7 ("In the mid-1960's, all MTS [Message Tele-
phone Service, otherwise known as long-distance] rates were charged according to duration
of call, time of day, day of week, and distance.").
5 See Drew Clark, The History: 1996 Telecom Rewrite Kept Focus on Phones, NAT'L
JOURNAL'S CONGRESS DAILY (2005),
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phones,6 introduction of new technologies that permit long-distance calls to be
made without using the established telephone network,7 and new billing sys-
tems that essentially disregard the distance component of long-distance calls
and focus largely on duration.8 While a 3% tax on long-distance seems rela-
tively minor to an individual taxpayer,9 it generates a substantial and steady
stream of revenue for the federal government."0
Section 4251 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on "communica-
tions services,"" which include "(A) local telephone service; (B) toll telephone
service; and (C) teletypewriter exchange service." 2 Currently at issue in vari-
http://www.njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/background/tb-
EKJZI I 12813148323.html; WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, STATISTICS OF COMMU-
NICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS iv (2004),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/SOCC/03socc.pdf
("Over 900 firms buy access from local telephone companies in order to provide long-
distance service .... ).
6 See generally CELLULAR TELECOMM. & INTERNET ASS'N, ANNUALIZED WIRELESS
INDUSTRY SURVEY RESULTS DEC. 1985-DEC. 2004,
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIAMidYear2005Survey.pdf (estimating that the number of cellu-
lar service subscribers in 1985 was 340,213 growing to 86,047,003 in 1999 and today, an
astonishing 109,478,031 people are cellular customers). This substantial increase in cellular
customers was in large part the reason traditional phone companies changed their billing
practices. See Proof Brief for the Appellant at 5-6, Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 984, appeal docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Office
Max Appellant Brief]. The new billing structure for traditional long-distance reflects a simi-
lar billing practice to that of the wireless companies. Id.
7 Jason L. Riley, A Cheap-Talkin' Bureaucrat, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004, at AII
("VolP turns a phone call into a cluster of data no different from an instant message or a
digital image. And because it's based on software instead of the circuit-switched network
hardware now in use, net telephony is cheaper.").
8 AT&T was the first to switch to this new type of billing structure; MCI and the others
quickly followed AT&T's lead. See Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 13 (noting that
AT&T stopped using the mileage band system in 1997 and MCI changed their billing prac-
tice in 2000). The change in billing practices altered the toll rate variations between only
three "mileage" bands-intrastate, interstate, or international-as opposed to the thirty
mileage bands that were in existence in 1965 when the current statutory language was
drafted. See Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 13; Pearce Declaration, supra note
3, at 6.
9 Using an average of the best rate plans for the District of Columbia, specifically the
Brookland neighborhood, the location of the Catholic University of America, the excise tax
on monthly service for an individual family who uses 240 minutes of long-distance would
be $0.42. This computation is based on an average monthly fee of $2.02 and the average
state-to-state price per minute of $0.05. See Lower My Bills,
http://lowermybills.phonedog.com/ld/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
10 Proof Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 31, Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 984 (explaining that "in 2000 only $1.6 billion (27%) of the $6 billion raised
through the tax came from the toll service component"), appeal docketed, No. 04-4009, (6th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Office Max Appellee Brief]; Office Max Appellant Brief,
supra note 6, at 23.
11 I.R.C. §4251(a)(2000).
12 Id. § 4251(b)(1).
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ous courts is the treatment of toll telephone service, widely known to the pub-
lic as long-distance service. The Internal Revenue Code defines toll telephone
service as:
(1) a telephonic quality communication for which (A) there is a toll charge which varies in
amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time of each individual communication
and (B) the charge is paid within the United States, and
(2) a service which entitles the subscriber, upon payment of a periodic charge (determined
as a flat amount or upon the basis of total elapsed transmission time), to the privilege of an
unlimited number of telephonic communications to or from all or a substantial portion of
the persons having telephone or radio telephone stations in a specified area which is outside
the local telephone system area in which the station provided with this service is located .
3
Although initially imposed in 1898 to finance the Spanish-American War, 4
the federal telephone excise tax was adopted in its current form in 1965."s The
language was drafted during a period when charges for long-distance calls
were based on the elapsed time and distance of each call.' 6 Since the 1990s,
telephone companies have developed a simplified billing structure whereby
charges for long-distance calls are based on per-minute fees, regardless of the
call's distance.'7 There has been significant controversy in the courts, because §
4252(b)(l)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code explicitly states that a tax will be
imposed on telephone charges that "var[y] in amount with the distance and
elapsed transmission time of each individual communication."' 8
Eight district court cases 9 have recently questioned the propriety of the con-
duct of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in continuing to collect a tax
based on a statute apparently at odds with the current long-distance billing
"3 Id. § 4252(b).
14 STEPHEN J. ENTIN, THE TAX FOUND., TAXING TALK: THE TELEPHONE ExciSE TAX AND
THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FEES I (Mar. 2000), available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/123.html.
15 Excise Tax Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-48 (1965)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.§§ 4251-4254 (2000)).
16 Francisca N. Mordi, Todd B. Reinstein & Laura C. Mow, Changes in Technology
May Make the Telecommunications Services Excise Tax Obsolete 2 (Sept. 2004),
http://www.bnatax.com/tm/insights Telecom.htm.
17 Thomas D. Sykes, The Growing Controversy Over Federal Excise Tax on Long-
Distance Calls 215 (May-June 2003), http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/tomsykes.pdf.
18 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
19 See Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004),
rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (1lth Cir. 2005); Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d
984 (N.D. Ohio 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004); Fortis, Inc.
v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,
2004); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2004);
Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No. 03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30,
2004); Honeywell v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188 (2005); Am. Online, Inc. v. United
States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571 (2005); Hewlett-Packard v. United States, No. C-04-03832, 2005
WL 1865419 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005). There are many other cases currently pending in
various courts.
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methods." In each of these cases, the taxpayers sought to recover federal ex-
cise taxes they previously paid.' At the trial level, the district courts found for
the plaintiffs in seven of the eight cases;22 the Eleventh Circuit subsequently
overturned the one case in which the government prevailed-American Bank-
ers Insurance Group v. United States.
23
This Comment will discuss why the now overturned district court decision
in American Bankers Insurance Group 24 was correct in its application of the
federal excise tax on communications. In addition to the government's ap-
proach in the line of cases relating to the telephone excise tax, this Comment
will suggest a slightly different approach in favor of applying the tax.25 Section
I of this Comment will begin by outlining the history of the federal excise tele-
phone tax. This discussion will be augmented with an outline of the history of
long-distance telephone services in the United States. Next, this Comment will
briefly touch on the economic realities of the excise tax. This Comment will
also explain how the district courts interpreted the federal telephone excise tax
and then analyze the major themes arising from these cases. Section I will con-
clude with a discussion of the impact of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.26 Section
II will discuss the canons of statutory construction with emphasis on the hier-
archy of relevant tax sources. Next, this Comment will attempt to unify the
20 Andrew Odlyzko, Pricing and Architecture of the Internet: Historical Perspectives
from Telecommunications and Transportation 24 (Aug. 2004),
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/pricing.architecture.pdf ("Today ... we are seeing
the spread of flat rates to long-distance telephony" as opposed to metered billing).
21 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (seeking a refund of $361,763.24);
Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (seeking a refund of $383,990.38); Forlis, Inc.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *2 (seeking a refund of $439,384.84); Nat ' R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (seeking a refund of $86,103.28); Reese Bros., Inc., 2004
WL 2901579, at *I (seeking a refund of $345,351.53); Honeywell Int'l, Inc, 64 Fed. Cl. at
191 (seeking a refund of $2,357,637.56); Am. Online, Inc., 64 Fed. Cl. at 573 (seeking a
refund of $201,141); Hewlett-Packard, 2005 WL 1865419, at *1 (seeking a refund of
$6,385,671.86).
22 Only one court held in favor for the government. Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F.
Supp. 2d 1360 (holding that the purpose of the statute shall control since the language of
I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) is ambiguous).
23 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
24 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 th Cir. 2005).
25 The government asserts a three-prong position arguing primarily that the current
long-distance services do fall within the statutory definition of toll telephone service. See
generally cases cited supra note 19. Failing that, the IRS states that the telephone services at
issue fall within the statutory definition of Wide Area Telecommunications Service (WATS)
and, as a last resort, that the telephone services fall within the definition of local telephone
service. Id This Comment will focus primarily on the first argument-that the statute ap-
plies to the current billing structures. Moreover, this Comment will offer a supplemental-
not alternative-argument, maintaining that the WATS provision covers more services than
previously noted. This Comment will not delve into the argument that long-distance falls
within the statutory definition of local telephone service.
26 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
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statutory language, the congressional purpose behind the federal excise tax,
and the guiding principles of taxation. 7 Section II will also explore alternate
theories developed in the various cases and pursue one theory of its own. This
Comment will then discuss the materiality and impact of this tax. Section III
will assess what the future holds for the federal excise tax. This Comment will
conclude by suggesting that the majority of courts have viewed the issue from
the wrong perspective and, thus, have incorrectly rejected the application of the
telephone excise tax to current long-distance plans. 8
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. History of the Federal Telephone Excise Tax and the Evolution of Long-
Distance Service
Congress enacted the telephone excise tax in 1898 as a means of financing
the Spanish-American War.29 It was intended to be a temporary measure and
Congress eliminated the tax in 1902 at the end of the war.3 Nevertheless, the
history of the tax is tumultuous.3 Collection of the tax is performed with rela-
tive administrative ease and produces substantial revenue for the government;
2
27 Good tax policy is based on certain fundamental principles. Three main principles
are: (1) equity or fairness; (2) simplicity; and (3) neutrality. See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON.
POLICY, TAX PRINCIPLES: BUILDING BLOCKS OF A SOUND TAX SYSTEM, May 25, 2004,
http://www.itepnet.org/pb9princ.pdf.
28 This Comment supports the outcome of the American Bankers Insurance Group case.
Nevertheless, the argument should primarily focus on the purpose of the statute as well as
the re-enactment doctrine. The author of this Comment would pay less attention to the "and
is or" argument, and demote that to a sideline rationale. However, these are simply slightly
different means to achieve the same end. See Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at
1360.
29 The tax in its initial form was a "one-penny tax." Beatrice E. Garcia, Tax Battles,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 30, 2004; see Spanish-American War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 55-
133, 30 Stat. 460 (1898); see also ENTIN, supra note 14, at 1; Kay Bell, Presidential Veto
Puts Repeal of Telephone Tax on Hold, BANKRATE.COM, Nov. 3, 2000,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/itax/tax watch/20001103a.asp (noting the tax had its start in
1898 "as a penny addition to long-distance calls of 15 cents or more").
30 Louis ALAN TALLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELE-
PHONE SERVICE: A HISTORY 1 (2001) [hereinafter TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELE-
PHONE SERVICE],
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL30553 01042001 .pdf.
31 The tax was repealed twice in 1902 and 1924. See generally id It was allowed to
expire once in 1916, and it has been extended twenty-nine times since 1932. Id. The tax was
not made permanent until the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §
11217(a), 104 Stat. 1388-437.
32 LOUIS ALAN TALLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX 1 (2000)
[hereinafter TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX],
http:/ibudget.senate.gov/democratic/crsbackground/teltax.pdf.
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it has been used to support all major wars,33 including World War I, World
War II," and the Vietnam War.36 In addition, the government has utilized the
tax when responding to periods of economic downturns37 and substantial
budget deficits.3 Although the tax has been in and out of the of the govern-
ment's favor, it has continuously been in effect since 1932. 39 In 1944, the tele-
phone excise tax levy was a hefty 25% and was reduced to 10% over the next
33 ENTIN, supra note 14, at I ("Every war [the United States] fought during the 20th
century was used to raise or extend the tax."). Since the revenues from the excise tax fi-
nanced every war fought in the twentieth century, some have named it the "war tax." See,
e.g., National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee, http://nwtrcc.org/phonetax.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005). There is an underground movement to protest war by not paying
the excise tax listed on telephone bills. See, e.g., Hang Up on War!,
http://www.hanguponwar.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); see also The Nonviolent Action
Community of Cascadia, Telephone War Tax Resistance,
http://riseup.net/nacc/telephone.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) (instructing visitors how to
refuse paying the tax as well as possible consequences for not paying it). Although the
common misperception is that revenues raised from the federal communications excise tax
support defense spending, the reality is that the revenues go into a general U.S. Treasury
fund. See TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 1; see also TALLEY: FEDERAL
EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 1.
34 War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300; see TALLEY:
FEDERAL ExCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 3.
35 Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, 55 Stat. 714 (making excise taxes perma-
nent).
36 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, 80 Stat. 66; Revenue and Expendi-
ture Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 265; Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 660: Excise, Estate and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-614, 84 Stat. 1843. U.S. Representative Wilbur D. Mills expressed the view of Con-
gress that these were temporary extensions and "Vietnam and only the Vietnam operation
ma[del the bill necessary." TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra
note 30, at 5.
37 TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 2 ("On Sep-
tember 4, 1914, President Wilson[, responding to a drop in imports,] called upon Congress
to raise an additional $100 million through 'internal' taxes (in contrast to customs duties)..
• . In response, Congress passed H.R. 18891 commonly known as the Emergency Internal
Revenue Tax Act of 1914. The Act was mostly a renewal of the excises contained in the
Spanish-American War Revenue Act. "); see Emergency Internal Revenue Tax Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 63-217, 38 Stat. 761. The federal excise tax was also used as a means of com-
bating the Great Depression. TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra
note 30, at 3; see Revenue Bill of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154.
38 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 11217(a), 104 Stat.
1388-437 (codified at I.R.C. § 425 l(b)(2)). Due to "large continuing budget deficits, Con-
gress concurred with [President Bush's] recommendation and made the tax a permanent part
of our tax revenue structure" at a rate of 3%. TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE
SERVICE, supra note 30, at 6; see also TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 3.
39 Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004); see TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, su-
pra note 30, at 3 ("Today's current telephone tax, derives from the Revenue Bill of 1932.
Since then, it has been reauthorized 29 times.").
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twenty years. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 19904" gave permanency to
the excise tax and reduced it to its current rate of 3%.42
The tax was initially deemed a luxury tax4 3 since the telephone was not
orinially widely used44 and was an expensive service.45 At the time, a signifi-
cant portion of the cost46 resulted from the requirement of operators to com-
plete connections.47 As telephones became more common,48 the tax evolved
into what some might consider a user fee.49
The basic premise of the telephone excise tax is to permit the federal gov-
emnment "to raise revenue by collecting a tax on almost all commercial tele-
phone usage." 0 The definition of taxable toll telephone service has not
40 SUMEET SAGOO, TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 128
(38th ed. 2004), available at http://taxfoundation.org/publications/show/147.html.
41 Revenue Reconciliation Act, § 11217(a).
42 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 1; see SAGOO, supra note 40.
43 ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS 26 (2000),
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/acec-report.pdf; see also IRS.gov,
http://www.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/j sp/s toolsglossary.jsp (last visited Sept. 8,
2005) (defining luxury tax as "[a] tax paid on expensive goods and services considered by
the government to be nonessential").
44 At the time the first telephone excise tax was enacted in 1898, there were 495,798
telephones in the United States. See ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE BELL SYSTEM'S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876-1909, at 160-61 (1985).
45 ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 43, at 26 ("Before the wide-
spread use of the telephone following World War II, the tax was considered a 'luxury'
tax.").
46 For an idea of how expensive phone service was at the time, see, for example, AT&T,
Milestones in AT&T History, http://www.att.com/history/milestones.html (last visited Sept.
8, 2005) (noting that the first long-distance call between New York and Chicago in 1892
was $9 for the first five minutes).
47 Odlyzko, supra note 20, at 23-24.
48 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 5 ("Telephones may indeed have been a luxury for several
decades.., but falling costs and rising incomes eventually made them common appliances
in most homes."); see AT&T, A Brief History: Origins,
http://www.att.con/history/historyl.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) ("Between 1894 and
1904 . . .the number of telephones boomed from 285,000 to 3,317,000."); see also
TelephonyMuseum.com, Telephone History 1940-Today,
http://www.telephonymuseum.com/History%201940-today.htm ("There were 30,000,000
phones in service in 1948[,] ...[and b]y 1971 there were over 100 million phones in
service").
49 See IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/j sp/s-toolsglossary.jsp
(last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (defining a user fee as "[a]n excise tax, often in the form of a li-
cense or supplemental charge, levied to fund a public service"). But see ENTIN, supra note
14, at 4 ("The telephone excise tax is not a user fee. It does nothing to promote phone ser-
vice. All of it goes into general revenue. It is a pure money raiser.").
50 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005). Almost all long-distance was intended to be
covered by the tax, except for the explicitly mentioned exemptions in § 4253. See I.R.C. §
4253 (2000); see also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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changed since 1965." The current definition is narrower than the earlier, very
broad definition. 2 It was narrowed in 1965 in order to reflect the then current
manner of customer billing for toll telephone services." In 1965, AT&T54
charges for long-distance were either (a) based on the elapsed time of each call
multiplied by a charge per minute; or (b) based on "a periodic charge that
equaled a flat rate or was calculated on total elapsed transmission time."55
This definition did not pose any problems until the mid-1990s. During this
time, telephone companies altered their billing methods56 moving to a system
of long-distance call charges "according to uniform toll rates ... not dependent
on the mileage bands ... [and] not otherwise designated as varying according
to distance."57 These new rates considered "postalized" rates58 were introduced
for two primary reasons: (1) distance factored less into long-distance costs;59
and (2) the end of the Bell System monopoly resulted in increased competi-
51 I.R.C. § 4252(b).
52 Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 133, 72 Stat. 1275,
1290 (current version at I.R.C. § 4252(b)) (defining taxable toll telephone service very
broadly as "a telephone or radio telephone message or conversation for which (1) there is a
toll charge, and (2) the charge is paid within the United States").
53 Excise Tax Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-48 (1965)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 4251-4254); see Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ.
5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) ("Because AT&T
had a virtual monopoly over long-distance service, the statute did effectively tax virtually all
long-distance service available at the time .... "); see also Am. Bankers Ins. Group v.
United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005) (citing Trans-Lux Corp. v. United States, 696
F.2d 963, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1982)) ("In 1965, it appears Congress amended the definition to its
current language in an effort to modify and update it 'in order to reflect and to meet the
changing technology and market conditions of the industry."').
54 Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (stat-
ing that AT&T "was the predominant communications carrier" in 1965), appeal docketed,
No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004).
55 Id. at 990 (citing Pearce Declaration); see Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 6 ("[A
call would cost] more based on the number of mileage bands crossed. In 1965, there were
more than 30 mileage bands developed by AT&T .... ).
56 See Sykes, supra note 17, at 215; Mordi, supra note 16.
57 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005). "The 30+ mileage bands went from 1-8 miles
to one that was from 2,301 to 3,000 miles." Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 6 (stating
that the more than thirty mileage bands in 1965 were eventually reduced to eleven).
58 LEVINE, BLASZAK, BLOCK & BOOTHBY, LLP, FEDERAL EXCISE TAX REFUNDS COULD
BE PAID IN FULL, Oct. 6, 2003, http://www.lb3law.com/docs/VoiceReportI00603.cfm. See
generally Odlyzko, supra note 20, at 23-24 ("[P]ostal services started out with distance-
sensitive tariffs. Later, after switching to what are now known as 'postal rates,' independent
of distance, they still were introducing services motivated by the incentives to price dis-
criminate, such as postcards.").
59 Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 6 ("As distance became less important as a cost
factor, due initially to technological developments and later to competitive trends, the mile-
age bands were reduced and/or eliminated.").
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tion.6° Have the communications providers outpaced Congress and avoided the
telephone excise tax simply by phasing distance out of current toll telephone
charges?
Although this change in billing may have escaped the attention of Congress,
taxpayers certainly did not overlook it.6 Prior to 2003, one law firm, Levine,
Blaszak, Block & Boothby, LLP ("LB3"), filed refund claims with the IRS for
its corporate62 clients.63 The LB3 lawyers noted that the standard IRS response
was to simply deny the claim. 4 Persistence was key at this point. LB3 asserts
that, upon requesting review of the claim denial, the IRS would then attempt to
settle the dispute by paying "30-40 cents on the dollar" of the requested re-
fund.65 After attempting to negotiate a better settlement for their clients,66 LB3
eventually filed suit.67
B. The Economics of the Excise Tax
In 2003, the federal government collected an unprecedented $6 billion from
the federal excise tax on telephone services.6" Since 1998, the collected tele-
60 Id. at 10 ("The break up of the Bell System resulted in massive changes in industry
structure, pricing of services, and the level of competition."); See United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), for further
information on the dissolution of the Bell monopoly.
61 Although a 3% tax on long-distance only costs an individual consumer a few dollars a
month, small and large businesses alike stand to save a much larger amount.
62 Individual consumers are essentially restricted from making refund claims of the
federal excise taxes paid within the statute of limitations. The cost would be too much to
pursue individually. Furthermore, class-action suits are extremely difficult to organize in tax
refund cases because of the rules and regulations relating to making overpayment claims.
David Rohde & Stephen Rosen, Wrangling for a Refund, NETWORKWORLD, Apr. 12, 2004 at
2, http://www.nwfusion.com/research/2004/0412telecomtax.html; see I.R.C. § 7422(a)
(2000); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2 (2005); Agron v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 325 F. Supp. 487, 488
(N.D. 11. 1970) (holding that failure "to name the claimants and the amounts due to each...
falls far short of the detail required by federal regulations").
63 Press Release, Levine, Blaszak, Block & Boothby, LLP, LB3 Scores First Win in
Nationwide Effort to Recover Federal Excise Tax Overpayments,
http://www.lb3law.com/docs/FETWriteup.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
64 Id.
65 Id.; see also Warren Rojas, Phone Tax Fix Could Put Refund Suits on Hold, TAX
NOTES 414, Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.lb3law.com/docs/TN0124.pdf ("[T]he Big Five ac-
counting firms had been pursuing phone tax settlement claims for years.").
66 Levine, Blaszak, Block & Boothby, LLP, supra note 63.
67 See generally Rojas, supra note 65, at 413 (noting that LB3 has worked on behalf of
six of the sixteen taxpayers seeking refunds and representation for seven of the claims is
currently unknown).
68 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2005-
2014, 87 tbl.4-8 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26-
BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE].
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phone excise taxes have been near or above $5 billion annually.69 Based on
these numbers, the telephone excise tax is the third largest federal excise tax
lagging behind only the excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol.7" While alcohol
and tobacco excise taxes generally are considered sin taxes,7 the telephone tax
is considered to be akin to a user fee.72 Although the purpose of a user fee is to
raise revenues to fund a specific public service,73 the revenues collected from
this particular user fee are deposited into the general revenue fund of the
Treasury.74 Former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") Reed Hundt75 stated that it was an excellent source of revenue since
telephone usage is so prevalent.76
The Congressional Budget Office projects that the federal government will
collect $86 billion from the telephone excise tax over the next nine years.77
Thus there is tremendous incentive on the part of the government to maintain
the current IRS interpretation" of § 4252 of the Internal Revenue Code.79 Addi-
tionally, Congress may view the various cases8" as an impetus to amend the
current tax code and make explicitly clear what its intentions are for taxing
69 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR 2006, HISTORICAL TABLES, 41-42
tbl.2.4 (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/hist.pdf.
70 ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 43, at 26.
71 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 5 (justifying sin tax as a supposed "means of reducing exter-
nalities-the damage done to innocent third parties by the misuse of the dangerous products
on which they are imposed").
72 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73 Id.
74 TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAx, supra note 32, at 2.
75 Reed Hundt was an FCC Commissioner from 1993-1997. Federal Communications
Commission, Previous FCC Commissioners,
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previouscommish.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
76 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 12. Entin called this the "Willie Sutton school of tax policy."
Id. Willie Sutton was a notorious bank robber who claimed that the reason he robbed banks
was because that was where the money was. See generally Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber,
The QUOTE, the Final Irony, http://www.banking.com/aba/profile_0397.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2005); see also TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 3 (asserting that
94% of households had telephone service in 1999).
77 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 68, at 87 tbl.4-8 (projecting what the annual col-
lection of telephone excise taxes will be, in billions: 2005-$7, 2006-$7, 2007-$8, 2008-$8,
2009-$8, 2010-49, 2011-$9, 2012-410, 2013-$10, 2014-$11).
78 The IRS asserts that the intention of the legislature in enacting § 4252 was to tax all
long-distance service thereby reading the "and" in the definition of long-distance in the
disjunctive sense. The IRS further contends that Revenue Ruling 79-404 permits the collec-
tion of the federal excise tax on long-distance services where distance was not a factor in the
charge. See Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1370-71 (S.D.
Fla. 2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 th Cir. 2005).
79 Rojas, supra note 65, at 414 ("[T]he Congressional Budget Office phone tax projec-
tions-which estimate that excise tax revenue is roughly $6 billion-are dependent on sus-
taining the status quo.").
80 See cases cited supra note 19.
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long-distance telephone service.8' However, it is entirely within the realm of
possibility that Congress was hoping for resolution from the courts-no mem-
ber of Congress wants to be responsible for promoting "new" taxes given po-
litical ramifications.
C. The Conflict Among the Federal District Courts
To date, eight district courts82 and one appellate court83 have ruled on the is-
sue of whether the 3% federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service
applies to long-distance billing policies that do not factor distance into the
charge of the call.84 Seven district courts have held in favor of the taxpayers.85
American Bankers Insurance Group" was the first to be decided in this line
of cases. So far it has been the only case holding in favor of the government,
although the Eleventh Circuit subsequently overturned it on appeal.87 In deter-
mining whether the long-distance services purchased by American Bankers
Insurance Group fell within the § 425288 definition of toll telephone service,
the court first looked to the statutory construction to determine if the language
was ambiguous.89 Ultimately, the court found the statute's use of the word
81 By amending the current code, the legislature will also have an opportunity to address
other emerging communications issues that could potentially fall under the umbrella of the
telephone excise tax, such as voice over Internet protocol ("VolP"). See Rojas, supra note
65, at 414 ("The FCC effectively absolved VoIP providers from state regulation in a de-
claratory ruling issued last November in connection with a dispute between Vonage Hold-
ings Corp. and the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission."); see discussion infra Sections
I.D, 111.
82 See cases cited supra note 19.
83 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
84 There are several other cases pending in various courts around the country. A sam-
pling of those companies filing suit to claim refunds are as follows (refund amounts are
noted in parenthesis, if available): Convergys ($6,001,070.22); XO Communications, Inc.;
Roll International Corp.; PNC Bank, N.A.; JP Morgan Chase & Co.; Wal-Mart; Global
Crest Communications; and United Technologies. See Rojas, supra note 65, at 413.
85 See Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 2004), appeal
docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ.
5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2004); Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No.
03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2004); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. United
States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188 (2005); Am. Online, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571 (2005);
Hewlett-Packard v. United States, No. C-04-03832, 2005 WL 1865419 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2005).
86 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004),
rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
87 See Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
88 I.R.C. § 4252(b) (2000).
89 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 ("In determining congressional
intent, courts should give overriding deference to the unambiguous language of a statute.").
20051
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
"and"9 to be ambiguous, as it harbors both a conjunctive and a disjunctive
meaning." Once statutory language is found to be ambiguous, the court may
analyze congressional intent.92
The court would have reached a congressional intent analysis regardless of
whether it viewed the language as clear based on the rule of United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.93 The Supreme Court, in American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc., held that "even when the plain meaning [of the statute] did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this court has followed that pur-
pose, rather than the literal words."94 In American Bankers Insurance Group,
the court decided that the amendments to § 4252 in 1965"5 were intended to
encompass all commercial long-distance services.96 Thus, not applying the tax
to current long-distance services would be unreasonable.97 When viewing the
circumstances surrounding the definitional change in 1965,9" the court stated
that Congress clearly intended to levy the excise tax on all commercial long-
distance available at the time99 and exclude only those services explicitly men-
tioned by statute.' Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
90 It is all too often that simple, everyday words pose significant problems to those in
the legal field. In 1998, the President of the United States grappled with the meaning of
the word, "is". See Clinton's Grand Jury Testimony, TIME, Aug. 17, 1998,
http://www.time.com/time/daily/scandal/testimony/temp4.html (Aug. 17, 1998) ("It de-
pends upon what the meaning of the word means. If is means is, and never has been,
that's one thing. If it means, there is none, that was a completely true statement.").
91 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
92 Id. at 1366 ("Section 4252(b) is therefore ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence of con-
gressional intent may be considered.").
93 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
94 Id. at 544 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
91 Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-48
(1965) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 4251-4254 (2000)) (narrowing the definition of
long-distance from its very broad earlier definition to cover the long-distance offerings by
the AT&T monopoly).
96 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68.
97 There have been several attempts to repeal the excise tax with the most recent being
in 2000. Although the measure passed both houses of Congress, it suffered defeat by a
presidential veto. See Bell, supra note 29. The rationale for repeal at that time was the large
budget surplus created in part from the excise tax collections. However, the economic situa-
tion has drastically changed in the past fourteen years and the United States has faced a
return of substantial deficits. See infra notes 194-95.
98 Excise Tax Reduction Act, § 302.
99 See Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 15 ("In summary, in the mid 1960s, AT&T
remained the dominant long-distance carrier in the United States.").
'oo I.R.C. § 4253 (2000); see H.R. REP. No. 106-63 1, at 3-4 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (stating
that exemptions include (1) public coin operated service amounting to less than 25 cents; (2)
service for the collection of various news by press agencies; (3) private service where there
is a separate charge for local telephone service; (4) service to international organizations and
American Red Cross; (5) long-distance services for the armed services; (6) telephone ser-
[Vol. 14
Federal Excise Tax on Long-Distance Service
"exemptions from taxation are to be construed narrowly."''
By reading the statute literally, the court would essentially eliminate the fed-
eral excise tax on the majority of long-distance services as most of this service
is currently billed without regard to distance. 2 Thus, the congressional intent
to raise revenues through a tax on long-distance service would be defeated.
The American Bankers Insurance Group court correctly viewed this as an un-
reasonable result.
0 3
The IRS also relied on a 1979 revenue ruling to support its position that dis-
tance may be overlooked when levying the telephone excise tax."° In this reve-
nue ruling, the IRS held that an offshore satellite telephone communications
system was subject to the federal excise tax on communication services even
though the charges were not altered by distance. 5 The court in American
Bankers Insurance Group held that although "revenue rulings neither have 'the
force and effect of regulations,' "nor can they be used to 'overturn the plain
language of a statute,"" 7 Revenue Ruling 79-404"'0 was persuasive' and "a
revenue ruling is entitled to as much weight as its persuasiveness allows.""o
The other seven district court cases in which the taxpayers found relief, as
well as the appellate case, followed a similar rationale."' Office Max, Inc. v.
United States paved the way for the taxpayers' cause holding that the plain
vice for non-profit hospitals; (7) certain service to common carriers; (8) telephone service to
State and local governments; and (9) telephone service provided to not-for-profit educa-
tional organizations).
101 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 745, 752 (1969); Comm'r v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28, 49
(1949); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 2d 6, 9 (1998); Gummer v.
United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 812, 816 (1998).
102 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
t03 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
104 See Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
105 Id.
106 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (quoting Davis v. United States,
495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990)).
107 Id. at 1371 (quoting Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995)).
108 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382 (holding that I.R.C. § 4252(b) will encompass a
communications service under the umbrella of toll telephone service where charges vary
only by the elapsed time of the call).
109 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 ("Even allowing for only the lowest
level of deference conceded by Plaintiff, Revenue Ruling 79-404 would be entitled to some
weight due to its persuasive analysis of legislative intent.").
1I0 Id. at 1371.
11 See Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 2004), appeal
docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ.
5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2004); Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No.
03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2004); Honeywell v. United States, 64
Fed. Cl. 188 (2005); Am. Online, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571 (2005); Am. Bank-
ers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 th Cir. 2005).
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language of the statute is "clear and unambiguous.""' Such a finding generally
eliminates the need to examine the legislative history of the statute."' The court
in Fortis, Inc. v. United States"4 noted that even if it were to consider the legis-
lative history and purpose of the statute, "the proper inquiry focuses on the
ordinary meaning of the [provision] at the time Congress enacted it."" 5 When
Congress enacted the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, "6 long-distance
charges were influenced by both distance and elapsed transmission time." 7 Be-
cause "the plain language of [the statute] accurately conveys what Congress
sought to achieve in 1965, ' 8 the court felt that it was not in a position to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the legislature." 9
Furthermore, these courts felt that the IRS's interpretation of the statute was
too broad and thus fundamentally wrong in Revenue Ruling 79-404.2' The IRS
employed the same logic in the revenue ruling that it hopes to utilize in the
current situation-although the particular communications service at issue did
not come precisely within the statutory definition of taxable telephone services,
the federal excise tax should apply nonetheless. 2' Through this ruling, the IRS
attempted to infuse flexibility into the statute to enable the law to evolve as
112 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 993 ("Congress expressly chose to define 'toll
telephone service' in terms of variation in both distance and time.").
113 Reese Bros., Inc., 2004 WL 2901579, at *3 ("If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, no further inquiry is necessary. Where an ambiguity exists, however, the
Court may look beyond the statute to the legislative history to determine congressional in-
tent.").
114 Fortis, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686.
"15 Id. at *30 (quoting Bedroc, Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004)).
116 Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-48
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 4251-4254 (2000)).
17 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2004)
("Both time and distance determined the charge for individual long-distance telephone calls
in 1965, and Congress' definition under § 4252(b)(1) mirrored that fact.").
118 Id.
"I Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No. 03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579, at *7 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 30, 2004) ("Updating the statute is not the Court's role, particularly when doing so
would require reading the term 'distance' out of the statute. As the Supreme Court has in-
structed, '[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and
rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."' (quoting Lamie v.
United States, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004))).
120 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382; see Reese Bros., Inc., 2004 WL 2901579, at *10
(holding that "in [their] view the IRS's interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute-a point which the IRS concedes").
121 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382 ("It is not toll telephone service because the
charge for such service does not vary with distance and therefore does not meet the re-
quirement of section 4252(b)(1), . . . [but t~he intent of the statute would be frustrated if a
new type of service otherwise within such intent were held to be nontaxable merely because
charges for it are determined in a manner which is not within the literal meaning of the stat-
ute.").
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technology advanced. 22 However, in National Railroad Passenger Corp., the
Court declared "only Congress, and not the IRS..., may update the statutory
text.' ' 23 The Reese Brothers, Inc. court revealed a general hesitation in "read-
ing the term 'distance' out of the statute[, as u]pdating the statute is not the
Court's role."' 24 The Honeywell International, Inc. court went one step further
and acknowledged that Congress may have been "short-sighted." The court
further stated that it is not a function of the judiciary "to rescue Congress from
its drafting errors and to provide for what [the courts] think ... is the preferred
result."1
25
II. ARGUMENTS
A. Canons of Statutory Construction at the District Court Level
Eight district courts have decided the issue of whether current commercial
long-distance plans fall within the statutory definition of § 4252.26 Seven
courts held that the language of the statute was not ambiguous; therefore, the
service did not fall within the statutory definition of long-distance and the
plaintiffs were owed refunds from the government.'27 Only one court did not
view the statute in such a superficial manner.'28 If the language of the statute is
so patently unambiguous, how is it possible that even one court could miss the
clarity? Was the district court in American Bankers Insurance Group wrong?
This Comment asserts that a deeper examination of the issues demonstrates
why the American Bankers Insurance Group district court is the only one to
have rendered a correct verdict.
The first step in ascertaining the meaning of a statute is examining the plain
meaning of the words which the legislature chose.2 9 In resolving the plain
122 Id. (asserting that the "intent of the statute would be frustrated if a new type of service
otherwise within such intent were held to be nontaxable merely because charges for it are
determined in a manner which is not within the literal meaning of the statute").
123 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2004).
124 Reese Bros., Inc., 2004 WL 2901579, at *7 (quoting Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S.
526, 534 (2004)).
125 Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188, 199 (2005) (quoting Lamie v.
United States, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39,
68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
126 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) (2000).
127 See cases cited supra note 19.
128 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004),
rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
129 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) ("As is true in every case
involving the construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language employed by
Congress.").
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meaning of a word, the court looks to the 'ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning,' absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different
import."'30 If a court finds the language of a statute clear and unambiguous, it is
at that point, the court's inquiry should cease.'3' Nevertheless, this general rule
indicates that there are instances when it is not only acceptable to delve further
to determine the meaning of a statute, it is also necessary. The federal excise
tax on communications is one such statute that requires a deeper examination
of its language and legislative history in order to determine congressional in-
tent.
As asserted by the government, the one word that truly poses any question
in the definition of toll telephone service is the word "and".'32 "And" has sev-
eral different meanings and is most commonly defined as "along with or to-
gether with;" however, "and" may also be used in "reference to either or both
of two alternatives."'33 When a word possesses multiple meanings, the court is
required to take into consideration the context in which it is used.'34 Examining
the context mandates an investigation into both "the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."'35
Since "and" possesses both a conjunctive and disjunctive meaning, the courts
were required to determine which meaning was employed for this particular
section of the Internal Revenue Code.
136
In those cases holding for the taxpayers, the courts held that "and" was used
only in the conjunctive sense given that companies billed long-distance by both
distance and time when the statute was drafted in 1965.' These courts relied
13o Honeywell Int 7, Inc., 64 Fed. Cl. at 198 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
431 (2000) (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997))).
131 Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) ("If the statutory terms are unambiguous, the inquiry generally
ends there, and the statute is construed according to its plain meaning.").
132 "And" is the critical word in this evaluation due to the phrase, "a toll charge which
varies in amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time .... . in the definition of
toll telephone service in § 4252. See I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) (2000); see also Fisk v. United
States, 70 U.S. 445, 447 (1865) ("In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the court to
ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled
to construe 'or' as meaning 'and,' and again 'and' as meaning 'or.').
133 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 80 (1993).
134 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1364 (S.D. Fla.
2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
135 Id.
136 I.R.C. § 4252(b).
137 Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 995 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
("While the Court recognizes that the word 'and' can have different meanings... it does not
believe that the use of the word 'and' in the phrase 'distance and elapsed transmission time'
can be read other than in the conjunctive."), appeal docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug.
10, 2004); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at
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on the principle that "statutes imposing a tax are [to be] construed liberally in
favor of the taxpayer.'
38
Construing "and" to mean "or" in this particular provision was held to be an
improper means for reading the distance element out of the statute thereby
achieving application of the excise tax to current long-distance plans.'39 As
noted by the majority, Congress did not indicate anywhere in the statute the
intention to utilize the peculiar disjunctive meaning for the word "and," which
is generally an uncommon usage. 4 However, "and" was used in the disjunc-
tive form in the very same section of the Code. 4' The courts paid little atten-
tion to this fact and instead focused on the circumstances surrounding the stat-
ute's enactment. At that time, long-distance charges were measured by both
distance and length of the call.'42 The billing structures of 1965 used "and" in
its conjunctive form. Although the majority of courts were correct to respect-
* 19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) (quoting in part Brown v. Garner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994))
("[A]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context ....
Nothing in the grammatical structure or context of § 4252(b)(1) requires such atypical
treatment of 'and' as 'or."'); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d
22, 27 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The Court has no doubt that Congress specifically intended to use
'and' rather than 'or' in § 4252(b)(1)(A) to reflect the technology of the day."); Reese Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, No. 03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2004)
("The fact that Congress may have intended 'and' to mean 'or' in other statutes or even
other provisions of this statute, however, does not compel a different result here."); Honey-
well Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188, 198 (2005) ("For the reasons set forth by
the courts in Office Max, Amtrak, Fortis, and Reese, we are likewise persuaded that the lan-
guage of section 4252 is unambiguous."); Am. Online v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571, 577
("[Jiust because 'and' may mean 'or' in some usages does not mean that in this instance its
plain meaning is not apparent."); Hewlett-Packard v. United States, No. C-04-03832, 2005
WL 1865419, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005) ("This court agrees with the numerous other
courts that have held the word "and" in section 4252(b)(1) is unambiguously conjunctive.").
138 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (quoting The Limited, Inc. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 1987)); see Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303,
314 (1938) (asserting that "if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer").
139 See cases cited supra note 137.
140 Id.
141 Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 27-28 ("As the American Bankers In-
surance Group court observed, later in the very sentence that contains the phrase at issue,
the word 'and' is used to connect § 4252(b)(1) to § 4252(b)(2), and it was undisputed that,
because satisfaction of either prong would render the services taxable, this latter 'and' must
be read as 'or.' In addition, the court in American Bankers Insurance Group correctly
pointed out that in § 4251(a), the statute imposes a tax on 'communications services' and
defines that term as meaning '(A) local telephone service; (B) toll telephone service; and
(C) teletypewriter service,' but that, since each type of service 'is a separate and mutually
exclusive type of service,' the 'and' in § 425 1(b) must also be read as 'or."').
142 Id. at 34 ("In 1965, AT&T computed the charge for every traditional ...long-
distance call by multiplying the elapsed time of the call by a per-minute toll rate selected by
matching the distance of the call against a group of mileage bands, each assigned a unique
rate.").
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fully disagree with the American Bankers Insurance Group court regarding the
interpretation of the word "and," these courts were incorrect to conclude their
inquiry at that point.'43
While the majority has held steadfast to the principles of interpreting the
plain language of the statute" and the "rule against superfluities,"'45 it has lost
sight of those principles when reading the word "distance."'46 These courts
erred through inconsistency of interpretation. Distance is defined as "the de-
gree or amount of separation between two points, lines, surfaces, or objects in
geometrical space measured along the shortest path joining them."'47 Nowhere
in this definition is an explicit or even implied requirement for a specified
separation that would act as a threshold for sufficiency to be considered dis-
tance. Furthermore, "[e]ven under the mileage band system, there was no dif-
ference in the rate for calls placed to destinations within the same band, but
spanning different distances." Therefore, "[u]nder the District Court's logic,
the statute was never more than a nullity.'
48
The majority has stated that the new billing practices for long-distance calls
have effectively removed distance from the calculation. 49 This is simply not
143 As noted earlier, there is a general rule that when the language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous, an inquiry into the meaning of the statute generally ends there; however,
there are exceptions to this general rule. This Comment proposes that the federal excise tax
on communications should be viewed as one of those exceptions. See supra notes 130-31
and accompanying text.
'44 See, e.g., Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 1001 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 541 (1940)) ("There is,
of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which
the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in
and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation."), appeal docketed, No. 04-
4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004).
145 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004) (noting that a statute should not be con-
strued to render any word inoperative).
146 See Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 996 ("Although in a broad sense distance
may in some cases be indirectly implicated by the jurisdictional classifications at issue...
distance in and of itself does not result in a variation in the charge, as required by §
4252(b)(1).").
14 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 658 (1993).
148 Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 54.
149 See Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (finding that there was no "evidence that
distance itself results in a variation" in long-distance charges); Fortis, Inc. v. United States,
No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) (assert-
ing that "the term 'distance,' in the context of the statute, has a clear and much more spe-
cific meaning that does not encompass distinctions based on geopolitical units"); Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) ("IBM employs
what it calls a 'postalized' fee structure .... It is so named because, like a letter mailed
through the United States Postal Service, the charge is the same whether the call is transmit-
ted across town or across the country."); Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No. 03-CV-745,
2004 WL 2901579, at * 13 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2004) ("[IJt does not appear that the distinc-
[Vol. 14
Federal Excise Tax on Long-Distance Service
true. 5° While distance factors less into the cost of a call than it did in 1965,' it
remains a factor nonetheless.
5 2
In order to compete with the flat-rate plans offered by cellular phones,'53
AT&T reduced the mileage band system, which was used for the majority of
the twentieth century, from thirty-plus mileage bands to three bands: interstate,
intrastate and international. 54 Although three mileage bands represent the same
area as the thirty bands did in 1965, 55 the majority felt that these were simply
"jurisdictional classifications" that serve "regulatory allocation purposes." '156
Such a classification system supports the notion that although long-distance
charges will still vary by distance, there is less opportunity for that distance
charge to vary. 57 While it may be true that the mileage bands are representative
tions between intrastate and interstate calls necessarily correspond to the distance the call
travels but rather on the political jurisdiction in which the call originates and terminates.");
Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188, 199 (2005) (affirming the rationale
used in the preceding courts' decisions); Am. Online, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 57 1,
581 (noting that even though billing differs for calls made between the United States and
Canada, that distinction is not based on distance, rather the result of "geopolitical divi-
sions").
150 Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 33 ("(A] difference in distance alone
would not necessarily have caused a variation in charge. The variation between charges
results from the product of the distance toll rate and the elapsed transmission time as a
mathematical function, not from a variation in the distance or in the distance toll rate.").
151 Compare id ("In 1965, the charge for all long-distance calls ... was calculated by
multiplying a distance toll rate (derived from mileage bands that the call crossed) and the
elapsed transmission time of the call."), with Sykes, supra note 17, at 215 ("Beginning in
the first half of the 1990s, long-distance charges have been increasingly based upon the
elapsed transmission time of the call, without regard to distance.").
152 See, e.g., Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 15 ("A toll call is still defined by [sic]
as a long-distance call since it travels over a long-distance network, using a variety of tech-
nological alternatives that are generally not used in local calling, and is clearly differentiated
from a local call. A toll call is further differentiated from a local call because the billing
information contains what is known as 'call detail,' i.e., the number that is called (which
also gives the calling party a geographical location of the called party, e.g., the 'area code'
of 213 designating Los Angeles and 212 designating New York City), the time and the
length of the call, and finally the price of the call. As we have seen, since the mid-1960s the
FCC has updated its own definition of toll services, based upon technological and market-
place imperatives, and aided by Court decisions and legislation.").
153 Id. at 13 ("[M]ost wireless carriers were offering fixed priced monthly plans with
several hundred anytime, anywhere minutes, thus abandoning the concept of distance as a
pricing component.").
"I See id. at 6 ("As distance became less important as a cost factor, due initially to tech-
nological developments and later to competitive trends, the mileage bands were reduced
and/or eliminated."); see also Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 10.
155 Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 6 ("The 30+ mileage bands went from 1-8 miles
to one that was from 2,301 to 3,000 miles.").
156 Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 996 (N.D. Ohio 2004), appeal
docketed, No. 04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004).
157 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 995; see Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note
6, at 10 ("The court also rejected the Government's alternative contention that, at a mini-
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of geopolitical divisions,"8 the fact remains that these bands still represent de-
marcations in distance.'59 Thus, these distance divisions cannot be ignored if
we are to hold true to the principles of plain language interpretation. The ma-
jority has been so preoccupied with "giv[ing] effect . . . to every clause and
word"'' 0 of the statute (and not reading distance out of the statute), that the
courts have in fact altered the plain words of the statute by reading in new re-
quirements for what constitutes distance.' 6' Thus, the courts have stepped into
an inappropriate role, which was so carefully noted---"only Congress ... may
update the statutory text."'62
The statutory language "must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"'63 when
the plain language is unambiguous "unless exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise."'" Exceptional results that are "absurd or futile" or "merely... un-
reasonable" permit the court to go beyond the literal language of the statute
and examine extrinsic aids, including legislative history.65 This Comment as-
mum, there were three remaining distance-based 'bands,' one for calls within states, another
for calls between states and a third for calls between countries. Although the court acknowl-
edged that 'in a broad sense distance may in some cases be indirectly implicated by the ju-
risdictional classifications at issue,' it concluded that 'these jurisdictional classifications' did
not result in variation in the charge by 'distance in and of itself."').
158 See Proof Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 50, Office Max, Inc. v. United States, No.
04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004) ("[Section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934] es-
tablishes, among other things, a system of dual state and federal regulation over telephone
service .... In broad terms, the Act grants to the FCC the authority to regulate 'interstate
and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication,' while expressly denying that
agency 'jurisdiction with respect to ... intrastate communication service .... ') (quoting
La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 260 (1986) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
152(b)(2000))).
159 See Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 6 ("[In 1965, t]hese so-called mileage bands
varied widely, for example calls made within mileage bands 8, 9, 10 and 11, could vary
widely in actual miles traveled and still be subject to the same rate, i.e., there was no varia-
tion in the rate paid by the customer."). While certain calls made within various mileage
bands were subject to the same rate in 1965, that class of calls has merely expanded since
2000; therefore, the tax should still apply.
160 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (quoting United States v. Me-
nasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
161 See Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 996 ("[I]n a broad sense distance may in
some cases be indirectly implicated by the jurisdictional classifications at issue.").
162 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2004)
(emphasis added); see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1978) ("It is not
for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the
specific events of this case been anticipated. In any event, we discern no hint in the delibera-
tions of Congress relating to the [law in question] that would compel a different result than
we reach here.").
163 Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (citing
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))).
164 Id. at 461 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
165 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("Often [the words
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serts that each court in this line of cases, except the district court decision in
American Bankers Insurance Group, is wrong because the literal interpretation
of the statute leads to not only an unreasonable result, but an absurd one as
well.
B. Are Results So Absurd to Require a Different Interpretation If the Plain
Meaning Argument Fails?
The excise tax was created as a temporary means of financing a specific de-
fense venture, namely the Spanish-American War.'66 Although originally de-
signed to be a temporary revenue raiser, it proved quite useful and was reem-
ployed in the early part of the twentieth century.'67 Congress then renewed and
extended the tax during times of crisis and governmental need for easy reve-
nue. 6 ' Each time Congress reenacted the tax, it was proposed as only a tempo-
rary measure.'69 Finally, this temporary tax measure, after being extended
twenty-nine times,"' was made permanent in 1990. '' However, the hope for
repeal had not completely dissipated; there was a groundswell of support for
repealing the telephone excise tax in 2000.72 The repeal, however, did not es-
of a statute] are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation.
In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or
futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but
merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.").
166 TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 2.
167 Id. ("On September 4, 1914, President Wilson[, responding to a drop in imports,]
called upon Congress to raise an additional $100 million through 'internal' taxes (in contrast
to customs duties) .... In response, Congress passed H.R. 18891 commonly known as the
Emergency Internal Revenue Tax Act of 1914. The Act was mostly a renewal of the excises
contained in the Spanish-American War Revenue Act.").
168 See generally id. (detailing the history of the federal excise tax on telephone service).
169 TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 2 ("The federal tax on long-
distance calls has been levied on a continuous basis since passage of the Revenue Bill of
1932 .... In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the federal telephone excise tax was repeatedly
imposed on a temporary basis.").
170 TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 3 ("Today's
current telephone tax, derives from the Revenue Bill of 1932. Since then, it has been reau-
thorized 29 times.").
171 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11217(a), 104 Stat.
1388-437.
172 H.R. REP. No. 106-631, at 2 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (attempting to phase out federal
communications excise tax within a two-year period); see Bell, supra note 29; Press Re-
lease, U.S. Representative Rob Portman, House Moves to Repeal Spanish-American War
Telephone Tax (Sept. 14, 2000) (on file with author) ("It's been 102 years since President
McKinley signed the 'temporary' phone tax into law to help pay the costs of the Spanish-
American War. I hope the President will declare the Spanish-American War officially over
by signing this repeal into law.").
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cape the budget battle between the White House and Congress."3
This excise tax takes an unusual form because of its early history as a luxury
tax."14 Nevertheless, as telephones became more commonplace, it developed
into something more along the lines of a user fee." 5 As a user fee, the revenues
raised are supposed to be earmarked to provide specific services or to support
the service on which the tax is levied."6 However, the revenues raised from this
tax are deposited into a general Treasury fund and may be used for any pur-
pose, which the government deems fit."' Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
communications excise tax is a true user fee. "' The fact that the revenues from
the tax are not allocated to a specific project or fund is also considered by some
to be poor tax policy."9 Because of this poor policy characterization, the fed-
eral excise tax never seemed to escape discussion of repeal. Due to the expo-
nential growth of the telephone industry,8 ' the telephone excise tax devolved
into a regressive tax.'8' Taxes are deemed regressive when the burden of the tax
is significantly higher in proportion to earnings on those in the low-income
bracket than it is on those in the high-income bracket.'82 So, too, is the belief
that this tax affects individual households in addition to taxes on their own
phone service since businesses paying federal excise taxes on phone communi-
173 Bell, supra note 29.
174 See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 43, at 26.
175 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 5 ("Telephones may indeed have been a luxury for several
decades ... but falling costs and rising incomes eventually made them common appliances
in most homes .... Today, we do not consider a telephone to be a luxury. Rather, having
access to a telephone is considered a necessity ...."); see supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
176 Id. at 4 ("The telephone excise tax is not a user fee. It does nothing to promote phone
service. All of it goes into general revenue. It is a pure money raiser.").
17 See TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 1; see also TALLEY: FEDERAL
EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 2.
178 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 1.
179 Press Release, U.S. Representative Rob Portman, supra note 172 (noting that the
federal excise tax on communications is regressive since it disproportionately affects lower-
income Americans).
180 See GARNET, supra note 44, at 160-63.
181 TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 2-3 (noting that a 1987 study
found that "among excises, those on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products would have
less of an impact upon low-income families than those on telephone service"); see H.R. REP.
No. 106-63 1, at 5 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) ("[T]he burden of the excise tax on telephone service
is regressive.").
182 ENTIN, supra note 14, at 5; see TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 2-
3 ("Excise taxes are labeled as regressive taxes to the extent that low-income people spend a
higher fraction of their income on the taxed item than high-income people .... It was noted
that the telephone excise tax would be assessed on nearly all low-income families since 94%
of households had telephone service in 1999."). But see id. at 3 ("Supporters of the tax also
note that federal programs to assist low income consumers gain access to and remain on the
telephone network are in part supported indirectly (since telephone taxes go into the general
fund) from the revenues this tax generates.").
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cations simply pass that burden on to consumers.'83 However, there are federal
programs, such as the Lifeline and Link-Up, designed to offset some of the
burden of the federal communications excise tax for lower-income house-
holds.'84
The telephone excise tax was enacted to raise revenue through a tax on long-
distance communications. At one time, long-distance was broadly defined as
"a telephone or radio telephone message or conversation for which (1) there is
a toll charge, and (2) the charge is paid within the United States."'85 This defi-
nition was amended in 1965 to reflect AT&T's 8 6 current pricing scheme and
was designed to apply to all long-distance, except those services explicitly ex-
empted in the statute.'87 It is clear that Congress intended to subject all com-
mercial long-distance to the federal excise tax on communications. Thus, it
seems absurd that a court could interpret the statute in a way that would essen-
tially repeal the tax.
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. United States, the court noted that "pol-
icy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of
[a statute], except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to
the text and structure would lead to a result so bizarre that Congress could not
have intended it."' 88 However, the court did not think it was bizarre, or even
unreasonable, that its reading of the statute effectively eliminated the federal
excise tax on the majority of long-distance communications as they are billed
today. Congress could not possibly have intended to create a statute that ap-
plied to so little, especially since this particular tax is such "an important
source of revenue for the Federal Government."'8 9
The current state of the economy is another reason for the absurdity of the
majority's view. 9' The federal excise tax lost its "temporary" status after
183 TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 2.
184 Id. at 3-4 (noting that these programs are funded in part from the general Treasury
receipts that are partially funded through the federal excise tax). The Lifeline program is one
that assists low-income households by reducing monthly telephone bills by an amount up to
the residential subscriber-line charge. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 187. Link Up is a program
by which telephone installation charges are reduced for low-income households. Id.
185 Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 133, 72 Stat.
1289-90.
186 Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that AT&T was the dominant provider
of long-distance services for the first century of telephone services).
187 I.R.C. § 4253 (2000) (listing the exempted services).
188 Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).
189 S. REP. No. 89-324, at 35 (1965).
'90 Am. Standard Watch Co. v. Comm'r, 229 F.2d 672, 675 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The need
today for governmental revenue is indeed great, but not so great as to justify, the stingy
statutory interpretation the Commissioner here espouses. The country is not that hard up.").
This Comment asserts that in 2005 the country is indeed that "hard up." See infra note 194
and accompanying text.
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ninety years largely due to the fact that the United States faced great budget
deficits and needed the income generated by the tax. 9' When those budget
deficits disappeared in 2000, the move to repeal the tax was again an issue. 2
That effort to repeal ultimately failed due to a veto by President Clinton. 9
In 2005, those deficits are back and larger than ever. 9 4 Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan stated:
When you begin to do the arithmetic of what the rising debt level implied by the deficits
tells you, and you add interest costs to that ever-rising debt, at ever-higher interest rates, the
system becomes fiscally destabilizing .... Unless we do something to ameliorate it in a
very significant manner, we will be in a state of stagnation. 95
Avoiding that "state of stagnation"' 96 certainly would not be aided by elimi-
nating the nearly $1.6 billion in projected revenue from the excise tax on long-
distance telephone service.'97 It is clear from the construction of the statute that
Congress intended to raise revenue by taxing all commercial long-distance,
save the exceptions explicitly noted in the statute.'98 By excluding a tax on
191 TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 6. ("Since
the tax had been a continuous revenue source since 1932 and because of the large continu-
ing budget deficits, Congress concurred with the President's recommendation and made the
tax a permanent part of our tax revenue structure ...."); see also id. (explaining that when
President George H. W. Bush submitted his budget in 1990 it included a proposal calling for
the federal excise tax to be made permanent at 3%). The tax was made permanent by a
President who stated during his nomination speech at the GOP national convention in 1988:
"Read my lips. No new taxes." See Character Above All: George Bush Glossary,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/glossaries/bush.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
Although this tax was not exactly "new" per se, President Bush saw the dire economic situa-
tion and was inspired to be the first President to make the federal excise tax on communica-
tions permanent. Id.
192 Press Release, U.S. Representative Rob Portman, supra note 172; see generally H.R.
REP. No. 106-631 (Conf. Rep.).
193 Kay Bell, supra note 29 (explaining that President Clinton vetoed the repeal of the
telephone excise tax because his education initiatives were not funded).
194 The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") projects the following yearly deficits: (1)
$331 billion in 2005; (2) $314 billion in 2006; (3) $324 billion in 2007; (4) $335 billion in
2008; (5) $321 billion in 2009; (6) $317 billion in 2010; and (7) $218 billion in 2011. See
Congressional Budget Office's Current Budget Projections,
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1944&sequence=0 (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
These budget projections will likely show greater deficits when the CBO updates these pro-
jections since they do not reflect the billions, which have been pledged to aid the Gulf Coast
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. See David E. Sanger & Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Rules
Out a Tax Increase for Gulf Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at Al. But see Michael A.
Fletcher & Jonathan Weisman, Bush Says Spending Cuts Will Be Needed, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 2005, at A01 (noting that the Bush Administration promises that "[t]his in no way
will adversely impact [President Bush's] commitment to cut the deficit in half by 2009").
195 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Says Budget Deficits Can't Continue, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2005, at Al.
196 Id.
197 Office Max Appellee Brief Proof, supra note 10, at 31.
198 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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long-distance that does not superficially vary with distance and elapsed time,
the courts will exclude essentially all long-distance from taxation thereby de-
feating the entire purpose of the law.'99 It is for Congress, not the courts, to
repeal a law.
C. The Reenactment Doctrine
The current statutory language for the federal excise tax on communications
was drafted in 1965. Since its original promulgation, the life of the tax has
been extended or amended ten times ° ° until finally attaining permanent status
in 1990."' Congress publicized its intent to tax all commercial long-distance
when it amended the definition in 1965 to reflect the long-distance services
offered at the time.2 2 It provided two specific provisions to cover the two
available types of toll telephone service,"' which Congress intended to tax.204
Rather than allow any type of service that did not fall within the statute's defi-
nition of toll telephone service to escape taxation, Congress expressly included
narrow exemptions. 5 from the tax. Thereby, Congress clarified its intent to tax
all phone service except that for which it provided.2 6
Congress did not anticipate the great changes that were to occur in the tele-
phone world, such as the demise of the Bell System2 7 or the vast number of
technological advances.0 8 While the language of the statute has remained
199 As discussed earlier, most, if not all, long-distance carriers have shifted away from
the traditional billing practices that were tied to mileage bands; therefore, if the majority of
long-distance is billed in a way that cannot be taxed under the majority view of the statute,
then the excise tax on long-distance communications will be essentially repealed. See supra
notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
200 See TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 9-10.
201 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11217(a), 104 Stat.
1388-437.
202 Excise Tax Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 145-46.
203 These two types of service are traditional long-distance telephone service and WATS
(Wide Area Telecommunications Service). Id. at 146.
204 See Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 20-21.
205 I.R.C. § 4253 (2000); see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
206 Congress again demonstrated its intent to tax all but the stated exceptions when it
drafted special rules to apply the excise tax to prepaid telephone cards. Cf Treas. Reg. §
49.4251-4(a) (2000) (explaining rules for the application of the federal excise tax to prepaid
telephone calls).
207 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982) (setting out the
provisions of the AT&T reorganization order).
208 Since 1965, the cost for telephone operations has dramatically fallen, the cell phone
was invented (and their numbers expanded exponentially), and consumers now have the
option of avoiding traditional or cellular telephone service altogether with the new Voice
over Internet Protocol technology. See generally Pearce Declaration, supra note 3, at 10-12.
See discussion infra Sections II.D, III (taking an in-depth look at the effect of the excise tax
on VoIP).
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static, the interpretation has not. In 1979, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 79-
404, which provided for certain telephone services to be taxed even when those
charges do not vary directly with distance.2"9 This twenty-four year old inter-
pretation is being questioned for the first time even though the statute at issue
has been reenacted six times since the IRS issued its revenue ruling."' The re-
enactment doctrine stands for the proposition that "Congress is presumed to be
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt
that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." ''
Ordinarily, a court is bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute
"unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 21 2
Interpreting the statute to reflect the current long-distance billing practices is
neither arbitrary nor capricious. Furthermore, such an interpretation is not
"manifestly contrary to the statute. ' -3 In fact, the interpretation by the majority
is counter to the reasonable construction of the statute.2 4 As noted in Chevron,
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, "a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency."2 '5 Since an agency "is entrusted to adminis-
ter" a particular statutory scheme, its interpretations should be afforded "con-
siderable weight. ' '216 Furthermore, "a revenue ruling is entitled to as much
weight as its persuasiveness allows, much like a decision from a different cir-
209 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
210 Even though there was a massive lobbying effort to repeal the federal excise tax on
communications in 2000, the lobbyists focused their multi-million dollar efforts on repeal-
ing the tax because it was poor tax policy. See Judy Sarasohn, Calling for Phone Tax Re-
peal, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2000, at A21. See generally U.S. Lobby Registration and Report-
ing Disclosure Page, http://sopr.senate.gov (last visited Oct. 5, 2005) (searching by name of
telecommunication companies in 2000). The coalition of anti-excise tax groups missed their
best argument for repeal-that the language of the statute was obsolete. Long-distance bill-
ing structures were altered several years before this lobbying effort was underway. How-
ever, the Joint Committee on Taxation did note as early as 2001 that "the [excise tax on
communications] provisions are so obsolete that, in many cases, they either fail to capture
many services that traditionally were seen as within the scope of the communications tax or
they capture those services unevenly." 2 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICA-
TION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 505-
06 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM].
211 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
212 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
213 Id.
214 The majority's strict interpretation of the statute would substantially reduce the col-
lection of the federal excise tax on long-distance services. However, in the event that the
majority continues to win and the strict, literal interpretation must stand, there may be an
opportunity for the IRS to continue collection, albeit through a different means. See discus-
sion infra Sections 1.D, Ill.
215 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844 (footnote omitted).
216 Id. (citation omitted).
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cuit can be persuasive but is not binding" on a court in another circuit.217
The majority of district courts have asserted that the IRS's interpretation is
not reasonable since the IRS concedes that certain services will be taxed even
though they fall outside of the statutory requirement for a "charge which varies
in amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time. ' While the IRS
acknowledged that this service falls outside of the specific statutory definition
of toll telephone service, it is not unreasonable for the agency to tax the par-
ticular service considering that it was not specifically exempted and that the
statute was created with the intention of taxing all commercial long-distance.
2 9
Although the Supreme Court later stated in United States v. Mead Corp.22
that the Chevron analysis was to be used only when "the statutory interpreta-
tion is recorded in a regulation that was subject to notice-and-comment rule-
making or was promulgated in a manner similar to formal rulemaking,
'22
1
revenue rulings should nevertheless receive the same standard of deference set
forth in Chevron. Revenue rulings are formal opinions rendered by the IRS,
which are not subject to notice-and-comment periods and are not binding opin-
217 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1371 (S.D. Fla.
2004), rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
218 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(l)(A) (2000); see Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d
984, 999 (N.D. Ohio 2004) ("[T]he Court finds that the reasoning set forth in Revenue Rul-
ing 79-404 is not reasonable and, therefore, entitled to no deference."), appeal docketed, No.
04-4009 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2005); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) ("[E]ven under the more deferential
standard, Revenue Ruling 79-404 is not entitled to deference because it is inconsistent with
the unambiguous definition of toll telephone service in § 4252(b)(1)."); Nat'l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28 n.6 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The Court is unper-
suaded by the reasoning in Revenue Ruling 79-404, which cannot overrule a clear statutory
requirement."); Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, No. 03-CV-745, 2004 WL 2901579, at
*10 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2004) ("[lI]t appears that the IRS's reliance on American Trucking
and the statute's legislative history when it issued Revenue Ruling 79-404 was not well
reasoned and, thus, it appears that the ruling should be given little, if any, deference.");
Honeywell v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 188, 200 (2005) ("This court has nothing to add to
the well-reasoned and articulate decisions on the issue in Office Max, Fortis, and Reese, and
adopts the conclusions and analyses set forth on this issue in those cases."); Am. Online,
Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571, 580 (2005) ("Revenue Ruling 79-404 is not thor-
oughly considered, it incorporates the concession that the literal meaning of the statute dif-
fers from the results it reaches ...."); Hewlett-Packard v. United States, No. C-04-03832,
2005 WL 1865419, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005) ("Since the court has concluded the stat-
ute is unambiguous, it need not give deference to Revenue Ruling 79-404, nor determine the
proper level of deference." (citation omitted)).
219 See Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 48 ("[A]s the American Bankers
Insurance Group court pointed out here 'there is other evidence that Congress understood
the definition of toll telephone service to include all long-distance telephone calls, even
those that varied only by time."' (citation omitted)).
220 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-33 (2001).
221 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
230-33).
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ions; however, they can have "the force of law." '222 Therefore, despite the strict
Chevron and Mead standards, revenue rulings should be afforded the deference
that has been reflected in recent circuit court decisions.223 The weight of defer-
ence has never been explicitly quantified, but it has been stated that revenue
rulings are due "substantial judicial deference." '24 Such deference to adminis-
trative agency determinations has been articulated by the Supreme Court on
more than one occasion. "'
The federal excise tax on communications has been reenacted eleven times
since 1965 and six times since Revenue Ruling 79-404 was issued.226 Further-
more, Congress has not made substantive changes to the core law, the focus of
this Comment, other than granting the tax permanent status in 1990.227
The reenactment doctrine has faced trouble in the courts, because it "tends
to be applied when there is reason, either based on the nature of regulatory in-
terpretations or the context of the reenactment, to presume that Congress was
aware of the interpretation, which it was supposedly adopting." '228 Additionally,
it was noted that a "few isolated statements" are not sufficient to constitute
notice. 9 Therefore, the question is whether Congress received sufficient notice
of the IRS's interpretation of § 4251 and acquiesced to this construal.
Although the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 79-404 in 1979,230 Congress seem-
222 See Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 43-44 ("The IRS promulgates reve-
nue rulings pursuant to its statutory authority 'to prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of the Code. Revenue rulings are formal interpretative rulings involv-
ing substantive tax law, Treas. Reg. [§] 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a) .... [R]evenue rulings have
legal force and effect in that they constitute 'precedents to be used in the disposition of other
cases' that 'may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.' Treas. Reg. §
601.601(d)(2)(v)(d)." (citations omitted)).
223 John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 82-84 (1995) ("In recent years, circuit courts have
uniformly held that Revenue Rulings receive significant deference, although only the Sixth
Circuit has granted them Chevron deference. The shift by circuit courts toward more uni-
form deferential review of Revenue Rulings may reflect their perception that the Supreme
Court has adopted a more deferential posture toward agency interpretations generally.").
224 United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001) ("[T]he
Revenue Rulings themselves are entitled to deference. In this case, the Rulings simply re-
flect the agency's longstanding interpretation of its own regulations. Because that interpreta-
tion is reasonable, it attracts substantial judicial deference.").
225 E.g., Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) ("Treasury regulations and inter-
pretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substan-
tially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the
effect of law."); see Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
226 TALLEY: FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 30, at 9-10.
227 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11217(a), 104 Stat.
1388-437.
228 Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *38
(S.D. N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004).
229 Id. at *41.
230 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
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ingly lacked notice of that interpretation as late as 2000, when Congress made
its last effort to repeal the federal excise tax. 3 In 2001, however, law firms,
accounting firms, and corporate taxpayers began a vigorous campaign to re-
quest refunds based on the obsolete language of the statute. 32 In order to limit
litigation and avoid widespread publicity, the IRS began to settle these claims.
While the IRS was attempting to minimize the public focus on these settle-
ments, it is certainly likely Congress was aware of these settlement expendi-
tures and that IRS officials alerted Congress as to the need to update the stat-
ute. Furthermore, Cottage Savings noted that long-standing regulations and
interpretations "are deemed to have received congressional approval." '233 There-
fore, irrespective of the court in Fortis 234 and other district court holdings that
Congress lacked sufficient notice, the Supreme Court follows the theory of
constructive notice.35 There is ample reason, given the press of the litigation in
this situation, to believe that Congress received notice of the IRS interpreta-
tion. Lastly, "[w]hether or not subsequent Congresses were aware of Revenue
Ruling 79-404, these Congresses clearly understood sections 4251 and 4252 to
impose a tax on all commercial long-distance service, not just service where
the toll rate actually varied by both distance and time." '236
231 See generally H.R. REP. No. 106-631 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
232 One could theorize that these lawsuits are a direct result of the study prepared by the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, which concedes that the language of the federal
excise tax on communications is a "source of complexity" for several reasons and the "pre-
sent Code provisions [should] be updated to reflect current technology." STUDY OF THE FED-
ERAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note 210, at 504-05 (2001); see LEVINE, BLASZAK, BLOCK &
BOOTHBY, LLP, FEDERAL EXCISE TAX REFUNDS COULD BE PAID IN FULL,
http://www.lb3law.com/docs/VoiceReportI00603.cfm (Oct. 6, 2003) ("After the customary
initial rejection and an appeals process, telecom managers and auditing firms say they've
come away with between 330 and 390 on the dollar-the standard settlement the IRS ap-
peals staff has been handing back to overtaxed enterprises.").
233 Cottage Savings v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991) (citing United States v. Cor-
rell, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967) (quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)));
see Office Max Appellant Brief, supra note 6, at 48 ("The Supreme Court in Cottage Sav-
ings made it clear, however, that actual congressional knowledge of the IRS position is not a
prerequisite to the application of the reenactment doctrine.")
234 Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *43
(S.D. N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004).
235 See Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560-61 ("Because Congress has delegated to the
Commissioner the power to promulgate 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment of [the Internal Revenue Code],' 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a), we must defer to his regulatory
interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable.").
236 Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1360, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2004),
rev'd, 408 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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D. The Current Statute As Applied to New Technology
If the American Bankers Insurance Group appellate decision237 is any indi-
cation of the upcoming telephone excise tax battles in court, the IRS should
also lobby for a legislative remedy. Furthermore, the proposed regulations238
would apply on a prospective basis, 39 so the current refund claims should only
prove to be a temporary drain on tax revenues. 4
The major focus of the communications excise tax controversy has been the
language of § 4252(b)(1).2 4 ' However, a solution may lie within § 4252(b)(2).
This part of the federal excise tax on communications is applicable to all ser-
vices that:
entitle[] the subscriber, upon payment of a periodic charge (determined as a flat amount or
upon the basis of total elapsed transmission time), to the privilege of an unlimited number
of telephonic communications to or from all or a substantial portion of the persons having
telephone or radio telephone stations in a specified area which is outside the local tele-
242phone system area in which the station provided with this service is located.
While the current technologies were not contemplated at the time the statute
was enacted, its language could certainly be construed to cover specific mod-
em-day technologies 243 even without revising the statute 4.2 A broad interpreta-
tion of the federal excise tax on communications would permit the government
to maintain the projected revenues raised through this excise tax.
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") in its most simple terms is technology
that permits a user to make a telephone call utilizing a computer network by
converging "voice and data into a single digit bit stream. ' '24 Although Con-
237 408 F.3d 1328 11th Cir. (2005).
238 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 49.4252-0, 68 Fed. Reg. 15690 (Apr. 1, 2003) (amending the
statutory definition of toll telephone service to remove the distance requirement).
239 Id. (noting that the proposed regulations "appl[y] to amounts paid on and after the
date of publication of these regulations in the Federal Register as final regulations").
240 Taxpayers are only allowed to make refund claims within three years after a return is
filed or two years from the date a tax is paid. See I.R.C. § 651 l(a) (2000).
241 See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.C (explaining the primary problem in the stat-
ute is that current long-distance is not tolled by both distance and elapsed time).
242 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(2) (2000).
243 See, for example, flat-rate long-distance plans, such as AT&T's Unlimited Plus Plan
and Vonage's flat-rate broadband phone service. See AT&T Unlimited Plus Plan,
http://www.shop.att.com/wrapper?portal=shopatt&product=shopatto runimp&service=d&
bannerid=NTD038TXTHP (last visited June 30, 2005); see also VONAGE,
http://www.vonage.com/tech/ (last visited June 30, 2005).
244 This, however, would only capture a very small amount of the revenue lost from the
outdated toll telephone language. Additionally, such an option would not be as wise as re-
vising the statute to reflect modem technology. Further, it would be in Congress' best inter-
est not to tailor the statutory language so narrowly as to exactly reflect the technology of
today, but to use broad language in order to allow the statute to evolve with advances in
communications technologies.
245 In re Excise Taxes; Communications Services, Comments of the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association, REG 137076-02, 2 (Sept. 30, 2004),
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gress has made clear its intentions to keep Internet technology tax-free and
minimize regulatory burdens, 246 mixed voice and data technologies, such as
VolP, fall somewhere between the traditional distinctions of telecommunica-
tions and information services. Therefore, they potentially fall within the scope
of the communications excise tax.247 Furthermore, as these mixed technologies
begin to be regulated in a manner closer to one service or the other,24 argu-
ments become stronger for those services also to be taxed like the traditional
services. The FCC has recently enacted new regulations, which are very simi-
lar to regulations on traditional telephone service. These new regulations re-
quire VoIP providers to furnish their users access to E91 1 services and allow
users to receive calls from and place calls to the public switched telephone
network, which is the traditional telephone network.249 The FCC acknowledges
that these regulations are similar to those placed on traditional telephone pro-
viders.25° As new regulations imposed on new technology gravitate towards
traditional regulations and traditional technology, it will be difficult to justify
the disparate tax treatment between the two.
III. OUTLOOK
Although the government has not proven successful in their legal quest for
application of the federal excise tax to current communications services, the
IRS has indicated that it has no intention to discontinue its collection of the
tax.25 ' Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of
http://www.ncta.com/pdf files/IRSEXCISE TAXES_093004.pdf. Although VoIP is a
phone service in that it allows people to communicate via telephone, the communications
data is shipped as data packets, which is the difference between VolP and traditional tele-
phone service. See generally Roy Mark, IRS Denies VoIP Tax Plan Claims, INTERNET-
NEWS.COM (July 16, 2004), http://www.intemetnews.com/infra/article.php/3382131.
246 See, e.g., VolP Regulatory Freedom Act of 2004, S. 2281, 108th Cong. (2004) (re-
stricting taxation of VoIP).
247 See Declan McCullagh, IRS Eyes Net Phone Taxes, CNETNEWS.COM, July 6, 2004,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9584_22-5258809.html?tag-sas.email.
248 See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Commission Requires
Interconnected VoIP Providers to Provide Enhanced 911 Service (May 19, 2005),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-258818AI .pdf. See generally In re
IP-Enabled Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report
and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 05-116 (2005).
249 In re IP-Enabled Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers,
supra note 248.
2S0 Id.
251 I.R.S. Notice 2004-57 ("This notice confirms that the Service will continue to assess
and collect tax under section 4251 of the Code on all taxable communications services, in-
cluding those communications services recently litigated with conflicting results."). See also
I.R.S. Notice 2005-79 ("[T]he government will continue to litigate this important issue ...
[and] the Service will continue to assess and collect the tax under § 4251 on all taxable com-
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the Treasury to prescribe "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of [the Code]." '252 Regulations issued under this statute are considered interpre-
tive regulations intended to clarify a current statutory scheme.253 On April 1,
2003, the Treasury issued a notice of proposed rulemaking254 providing "[f]or a
communications service to constitute toll telephone service described in sec-
tion 4252(b)(1), the charge for the service need not vary with the distance of
each individual communication. '255 The proposed rule fixes the problem at is-
sue in all of the cases discussed in this Comment by updating the statute to
reflect the current long-distance billing practices. It also gives the statute some
flexibility to grow with technology as it continues to evolve.
Moreover, "if the regulation becomes final, a taxpayer suing to recover a tax
refund respecting charges for long-distance service would have to demonstrate
the regulation does not implement the statute in a reasonable manner. "256 The
majority of courts will most likely continue to argue that taxing all long-
distance under this provision is unreasonable; however, as demonstrated by the
legislative history of the statute in addition to other overwhelming evidence, it
is clear that Congress intended to continue to raise a substantial amount of
money through this tax.257 A taxpayer would bear the substantial burden of
proving this clarifying regulation is not reasonable. The proposed regulation
simply mirrors the longstanding view of the IRS towards this revenue raising
provision, which has been the subject of constant debate for over 100 years.258
One wonders how many more court cases it will take to resolve this issue. If
corporate taxpayers witness other companies receiving large refunds as a result
of these suits, surely the caseload will continue to increase. How many suits
will the government continue to defend until it decides that the courts are not
favorable to their arguments? It is easy to imagine that this litigation will con-
tinue until the Supreme Court or Congress provides a definitive answer. 59
Congress seems reluctant, however, to step in due to the current political cli-
mate: the 2004 elections had a primary focus on tax policy and in particular,
munications services[] ... ").
252 I.R.C. § 7805 (2000).
253 Sykes, supra note 17, at 217 n.7.
254 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 49.4252-0, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,690 (Apr. 1, 2003).
255 Id.
256 Sykes, supra note 17, at 217 n.7 ("The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the
IRS (citation omitted), identifies section 7805 as the authority for the regulation, so the
regulation, if issued, would be classified as interpretive .... By contrast, legislative regula-
tions-which are more difficult to overturn-are issued under a specific statutory grant of
rulemaking authority.").
257 See supra note 77.
258 See Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
259 See generally Rojas, supra note 65, at 413.
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tax cuts. 6' No member of Congress wants to take responsibility and reinvigo-
rate such a seemingly minor tax that has had a wildly unpopular 100-year his-
tory.26" ' While it is impossible to predict what, if anything, Congress will do,
one thing is for sure-the statute needs to be updated not only for current tele-
phone billing practices, but also to allow for technology to continue to grow.
262
The importance of this statute cannot be stated enough as the budget for many
years to come depends in part on this stable income source.263
While no member of Congress has risen to the challenge to sponsor legisla-
tion updating the language of the statute, congressional committees, such as the
Joint Committee on Taxation, are proposing several options. Specifically, the
Joint Committee proposed three options that vary in degree of "fundamental
change.'2 65 The first option simply updates the statutory language making cur-
rent local and long-distance services taxable under the statute.266 This option is
very similar to the proposed Treasury regulations in that it modifies the current
statutory language but does not address the tax treatment of any new technol-
ogy.267 The Joint Committee's second proposal would tax all voice communica-
tions, "regardless of its technical form," in addition to revising the list of ex-
emptions.26 The final and most expansive proposal suggests that, in addition to
the changes made in the second option, "the communications excise tax base
260 SCOTT HODGE, TAX FOUND., REFORM Is ON THE WAY? TAX POLICY AND THE 2004
ELECTIONS (2004), http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/l59.html.
261 U.S. Representative Gary Miller of California initiated an effort to repeal the tax in
the House of Representatives, which has 135 co-sponsors, and Senator Rick Santorum of
Pennsylvania introduced the related Senate bill which boasts eight co-sponsors. See Tele-
phone Excise Tax Repeal Act of 2005, H.R. 1898, 109th Cong., (2005); see also S. 1321,
109th Cong., (2005). See generally TALLEY: TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX, supra note 32, at 2-5.
But see John Dickerson, Pity the Poor Fiscal Conservative, SLATE, Sept. 20, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2126637 (arguing that although there is "a game of chicken be-
tween Congress and the White House," the current deficit projections may bring about a
period where the advice of "fiscal nitpickers" is heeded).
262 Rojas, supra note 65, at 414 (noting that the FCC may "ultimately push Congress to
revisit the seemingly antiquated phone tax rules, although ... any potential phone tax over-
haul 'should be a basement to attic rewrite' rather than a collection of piecemeal fixes that
might require periodic fine-tuning").
263 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2005-2014, CBO's PROJECTIONS OF EXCISE TAX RECEIPTS, BY CATEGORY 87, tbl.4-8 (2004),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26-BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf.
264 See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print 2005),
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
265 Id. at 372-73.
266 Id. at 373.
267 Compare STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 264, at 373, with Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 49.4252-0, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,690 (Apr. 1, 2003).
268 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 264, at 373-75 (stating that certain ex-
emptions, such as those for the press, common-carriers and networks would be expanded,
while the exemption for private communications services would be limited).
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[will be] . . . expanded to include all data communications services to end-
users." '269 Currently, no action has been taken on the Joint Committee's propos-
als; however, this committee is considered extremely influential, and its pro-
posals are often the precursors to new tax laws.27
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the current statutory framework is in dire need of up-
dating. With the advent of new technologies and the changes within the tradi-
tional long-distance industry, "a basement to attic rewrite"27' should be under-
taken rather than more disjointed attempts to modernize the tax code. The stat-
ute requires too much analytical thinking in order to achieve Congress' desired
effect. Congress should clarify and update the language not only to reflect the
current billing practices of communications companies, but also to inject flexi-
bility in the statute enabling it to grow with the telecommunications field, a
field known for its rapid advancements.
A quick reading of the taxation statute pressed upon toll telephone services
"which varies [the taxes assessed depending upon] ... the distance and elapsed
transmission time," '272 may indicate that current long-distance billing practices
would fall outside of the services taxed by the federal communications excise
tax. However, further analysis into the plain language of the statute indicates
that "and" may sometimes mean "or." Additionally, the majority of courts have
erred in their reading of the word "distance." The statute does not prescribe
any specificity regarding distance. Nevertheless, by conceding that actual dis-
tance was in some way implicated, the long-distance charges meet the vague
statutory threshold for taxation of charges that vary by distance and elapsed
time. Although that calculation of distance is not the same as it was in 1965,
the definition of distance, as defined by the statute, is still satisfied. If the
courts were to apply the majority logic, and strictly, yet superficially, read the
language of the statute, they would reach the unreasonable result of drastic
reductions in the amount of revenue raised. For a provision to be noted as a
"source of revenue"273only to be drastically reduced through litigation is ab-
surd. Indeed, case law actually prohibits this result.274 In addition, the legisla-
269 Id. at 375.
270 See Joe Stephens, Panel Advises Ending Tax Breaks for Easements, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 2005, at A12.
271 Rojas, supra note 65, at 414.
272 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) (2000).
273 S. Rep. No. 89-324, at 35 (1965).
274 See Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Comm'r,
350 U.S. 46 (1955); Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
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tive history of the federal excise tax statute demonstrates a clear congressional'
intent to tax all non-private communications services not explicitly exempted
by statute. Finally, Congress has acquiesced to the IRS interpretation of the
statute issued in Revenue Ruling 79-404 by reenacting it eleven times. Such
conduct indicates the intent of Congress to collect on all communications ser-
vices not explicitly exempted by statute regardless of whether the services are
distance-sensitive.
For these reasons, it is clear that the district court in American Bankers In-
surance Group276 was correct in its decision to support the government's posi-
tion-courts should not award refunds to corporate claimants who assert they
have been overtaxed. Appellate courts should take note of the district court
decision in American Bankers Insurance Group-as it is the only court which
has correctly decided this issue.
275 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
276 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla.
2004).
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